I am a Research Fellow at the Dianoia Institute of Philosophy at Australian Catholic University. Before that, I held a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Southern California.
I received my DPhil in Philosophy at the University of Oxford in February, 2019. My doctoral thesis (Essays on the Emotions) was supervised by Ofra Magidor,.
In 2015, I completed my Masters in Philosophical Studies at King's College London under the supervision of Bill Brewer and Clayton Littlejohn. Before that, I received my Bachelor's degree (in Philosophy) from Chapman University.
My research focuses on a variety of foundational issues within the philosophy of the emotions. I am interested in a range of questions about their nature, intentional content, and epistemic roles. I engage extensively with topics in philosophy of mind, epistemology, philosophy of language, and cognitive psychology.
ARE ALL REASONS CAUSES?
Philosophical Studies, 2016
In this paper, I revisit the Davidsonian thesis that all reasons are causes. Drawing on a better taxonomy of reasons than the one Davidson provides, I argue that this thesis is either indefensible or uninteresting.
REASONS AND FACTIVE EMOTIONS
Philosophical Studies, 2018
In this paper, I present and explore some ideas about how factive emotional states and factive perceptual states each relate to knowledge and reasons. This discussion will shed light on the so-called ‘perceptual model’ of the emotions.
EMOTIONS, EVIDENCE, AND KNOWLEDGE
Forthcoming in Synthese
In this paper, I explore a variety of ways that the emotions can be of epistemic value. First, emotions can provide bona fide reasons to believe evaluative propositions, and thus provide evidence for those propositions by raising the epistemic probability of their being true. Second, when emotions are not playing an evidential role, they can enhance the safety of belief forming processes and thus facilitate knowledge. I conclude by exploring their potential for explaining patterns of knowledge attribution and argue that emotionally-driven variations in knowledge attribution are an important and neglected category of cases that merit further consideration.
(my charming daughter)