I am a Research Fellow at the Dianoia Institute of Philosophy at Australian Catholic University. Before that, I held a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Southern California.
I received my DPhil in Philosophy at the University of Oxford in February, 2019. My doctoral thesis (Essays on the Emotions) was supervised by Ofra Magidor,.
In 2015, I completed my Masters in Philosophical Studies at King's College London under the supervision of Bill Brewer and Clayton Littlejohn. Before that, I received my Bachelor's degree (in Philosophy) from Chapman University.
My research focuses on a variety of foundational issues within the philosophy of the emotions. I am interested in a range of questions about their nature, intentional content, and epistemic roles. I engage extensively with topics in philosophy of mind, epistemology, philosophy of language, and cognitive psychology.
ARE ALL REASONS CAUSES?
In this paper, I revisit the Davidsonian thesis that all reasons are causes. Drawing on a better taxonomy of reasons than the one Davidson provides, I argue that this thesis is either indefensible or uninteresting.
REASONS AND FACTIVE EMOTIONS
In this paper, I present and explore some ideas about how factive emotional states and factive perceptual states each relate to knowledge and reasons. This discussion will shed light on the so-called ‘perceptual model’ of the emotions.
EMOTIONS, EVIDENCE, AND SAFETY
In this paper, I explore two ways that emotions can facilitate knowledge. First, I present and defend a strong prima facie case for the idea that emotions can play an evidential role with respect to belief formation. Second, I explore some ways that the emotions can be knowledge-conducive without being evidential. In this connection, I outline the safety conception of knowledge and point to some relevant research that strongly suggests there are many cases where the emotions may enhance the safety of various kinds of belief.
DOXASTIC COGNITIVISM: AN ANTI-INTELLECTUALIST THEORY OF EMOTION
Cognitivism about the emotions is often presented as the view that emotions are evaluative judgments. In this paper, I present and explore an alternative to judgment-based cognitivist approaches that is not well-represented in the literature—an approach that I shall call, Doxastic Cognitivism. Doxastic Cognitivism combines an anti-intellectualist view of belief with the thesis that emotions involve evaluative beliefs.
NECESSITISM AND CONCRETENESS
Necessitism is the view that necessarily everything is necessarily identical to something. In Modal Logic as Metaphysics, (2013) Timothy Williamson defends necessitism and uses concreteness as a tool for drawing some intuitive distinctions. I am not interested in challenging the idea that theorists (especially Williamson) can make significant progress on the topic of necessitism without worrying too much about what concreteness amounts to. But it may be immodest for theorists not to worry at all. In this essay, I shall explore various answers to the question, ‘What is it to be concrete?’ in the context of a general necessitist framework.
Conditionals that embed factive emotives in the consequent seem to present a counterexample to modus ponens. In this essay, I present the puzzle and propose a solution—one that connects in interesting ways to the role of emotion in suppositional reasoning and in our cognitive lives more generally.
Philosophers often use the verb ‘recognize’ in philosophical discourse but there has been surprisingly little discussion of the phenomenon of recognition itself. The purpose of this paper is to remedy this gap.
PORNOGRAPHY AND ACCOMMODATION
draft available soon