Philosophers often use the verb ‘recognize’ in philosophical discourse but there has been surprisingly little discussion of the phenomenon of recognition itself. The purpose of this paper is to remedy this gap.
In this paper, I explore and defend the cognitivist view that emotions involve beliefs. My defensive strategy involves carefully distinguishing belief from judgment and motivating an anti-intellectualist conception of belief.
In this paper, I offer a solution to a puzzle that is presented by certain embeddings of emotional verbs in conditionals (e.g. If John is at the pub, I’m surprised). Against competing solutions to the puzzle, I present a solution that turns on the nature of reasoning under supposition.
THE SAFETY CONCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE
(Co-authored with John Hawthorne) Our discussion has three parts. We begin with a survey of various safety proposals in the literature (including those advanced by WIlliamson, Sosa and Pritchard) and show how and why some of these views fare considerably better than others. On the heels of this discussion, we propose some important lessons for safety theorists. One such lesson concerns how one should think about methods, another concerns the pitfalls of proposing a theory of knowledge that combines safety as a necessary condition with an orthogonal condition (e.g. a virtue-theoretic condition). To end, we articulate a few important challenges to the safety approach. One such challenge concerns the question of how an asymmetric epistemic accessibility relation could be built out of a relation that is ostensibly symmetric (closeness).
MARLOWE SAINT HAWTHORNE
The Bayesian Superbaby?
I was pregnant with Marlowe when I started my DPhil program at Oxford. She was born on March 15th, 2016 (The Ides of March!) and it has been an adventure ever since!